Introduction
Parent-offspring conflict stays in the spotlight of biological investigations [1, 2, 3, 4] . 65
Begging behaviour where offspring solicit food from their parents can be found in many 66 species ranging from insects to birds (see reviews [5, 6] ). Solicitation appears to be 67 honest in general, as much as needier offspring beg more intensively [6] . Such honest 68 begging is perplexing at first. Trivers [7] in his seminal work predicted that there is a 69 conflict of interest between parent and offspring regarding the ratio of resources 70 allocated to the offspring. If there is indeed a conflict of interest between parent and 71 offspring, then offspring are expected to solicit more food than the parental optimum 72 would be. Costly signalling was proposed as a solution to this problem [8, 9, 10, 11] . 73
These models argue that offspring solicitation must be costly, and this cost should 74 remove conflict of interest between parent and offspring by moving the offspring's 75 optimal resource allocation into the position of the parental optimum [9,10,11]. 76 While costly signalling models proposed a potential solution to the problem, there is 77 still an ongoing debate about the validity of the assumptions of the costly signalling 78 models and about the potential information content of begging calls [12, 13, 14, 15, 16] . 79
These debates are difficult to resolve for several reasons. One of them is that begging 80 is a special type of a conflict situation: (i) it is within the family, hence interactions 81 are non-random; (ii) genes playing against their own copies [17] . Accordingly, parent-82 offspring conflict potentially violates two basic assumptions of game theoretical 83 models: (i) random interaction of players, (ii) the idea of independent players. 84
On top of these problems there are at least two kind of optimization problems: (i) 85 the first one is a resource allocation problem between parents and offspring with an 86 element of uncertainty about the quality of the offspring; (ii) and the second one is a 87 dynamic temporal problem of food allocation between offspring with an element of 88 uncertainty about the satiation of the offspring (hunger). Roughly speaking, these two 89 optimization problems correspond to the strategic vs. tactical levels of the situation. 90
On the strategic level the question is how to allocate resources between parent and 91 offspring based on the quality of the offspring and the quality of environment in order 92 to achieve the strategic goal of the parents (i.e. phenotype fitness maximalization). 93
For example, in good years parents can raise all the offspring, but they still might 94 want to allocate more food to high quality offspring; on the other hand, in bad years 95 the parents might want to raise only high-quality offspring and sacrifice the low-96 quality ones. It is worth to note that this first level is a conceptual level and parents 97 never have to make this decision during their lives (i.e. what part of the overall 98 resources should go to the offspring). Second, parents have to make tactical decisions 99 in order to achieve their strategic goals, these are the actual decisions parents will 100 make during their lifetime. They have to decide which offspring to feed at any given 101 feeding bout so that (i) they receive the overall amount food optimal for the parent, 102 and that (ii) those offspring survive that serve the interest of the parent. reproductive period. 108 6 they may not know the quality of the environment or the offspring or both. These 113 strategic goals might even change during the season, the environment might be better 114 than expected or some offspring might be eaten by predators, etc. However, we think 115 that it is still important to differentiate between these problems on a conceptual and 116 modelling level. 117
Since there are more than one optimization problems, parents are expected to 118 gather information on all important aspects. We argue that the current debate in the 119 literature is mostly due to the fact that these optimization problems are confused. 120
Begging signals are complex, and it is highly likely that they contain information on 121 both problems. How parents use this information is another, interesting question. 122
Parents can use the information selectively, depending on the environment [1], 123 ignoring one or the other component (which, of course corresponds to the different 124 strategic goals: e.g. either raise all the offspring or raise only the best). 125
126
Here we present a minimal model to investigate these optimization problems. This 127 model is a two-stage process where the first model investigates the tactical decisions 128 of the parents in the temporal dimension, whereas the second model investigates the 129 strategic resource allocation problem in the light of the results of the first model. Our 130 phenotypes: honest vs. dishonest. However, these phenotypes do not play against each 138 other during the reproductive stage due to the structure of the game (i.e. interactions 139 are within the family) and the nature of reproduction (i.e. like beget like). While 140 honest and dishonest types do not compete in the family, yet they compete on the 141 population level (survival stage). We use a Markov chain model to investigate the 142 family level interactions (tactical decisions) and a life-history model to investigate the 143 population level competition and the resource allocation problem related to this stage 144 (strategic decisions). Figure 
152
We present a null model, which is the simplest model possible. We investigate 153 whether honest begging could provide any advantage in such scenario. If such null 154 model can show that honest begging can be advantageous under some conditions, 155 then this makes other more complicated models unnecessary under the same 156 conditions. Here we show that honest begging decreases the variance of food acquired 157 by siblings, which leads to higher survival when the clutch size is around the 158 optimum. 159 160 161
Results
First, we discuss the results of the dynamic temporal model (tactical level). Result 4. If m > mf, then the survival probability of the focal nestling (q) is a 176 monotone decreasing function of  2 (α), which means that if food is abundant enough, 177 then the honest family will raise more surviving nestlings on average than the selfish 178 family. On the other hand, if m < mf, then q is a monotone increasing function of 179  2 (α), which means that if food is scarce, then the selfish family will have the largest 180 number of surviving offspring on average. 181 survive. When the number of nestlings is more than five, then food is scarce, and 187 practically all nestlings will die. The most interesting case is when there are 5 188 nestlings, all of which will get 300 units of food on average. In this case the expected 189 number of survivors is between 4.45 and 4.72, depending on α. At the end of the interaction we calculate the survival probability of the offspring 251 based on the food accumulated during the period of parental care. We make three 252 simplifying assumptions: (i) we assume that there is no quality difference between the 253 offspring, (ii) we also assume that offspring has unlimited capacity (cannot be 254 saturated by food) and (iii) they cannot die of hunger during the period of parental 255 care. These assumptions are clearly unrealistic; however, our goal is to present the 256 simplest analytically tractable model of offspring begging. 257
Each nest has n offspring. Parents bring a food item to the nest at every time step. 258
Each food item has the same value, say 1. The reproductive stage consists of T time 259 steps (T is supposed to be large enough), it follows that the parents bring T units of 260 food to the nest. We further assume that parents keep some food to themselves (M -261 T) out of the total amount of food they gathered (M). 262
We consider the following stochastic model: each nestling can behave in two 263 different ways: it opens its beak either wide (i.e., it begs for food) or narrow (i.e., it 264 does not beg for food). The parent chooses a begging nestling at random, and puts the 265 food in its beak. If none of the nestlings are begging, the parent chooses one of the n 266 nestlings at random, and puts the food in its beak. 267
We suppose that after receiving food, a nestling will get hungry after a 268 geometrically distributed amount of time, with parameter α. We will say that a 269 nestling is digesting, if it is not hungry. If a nestling is digesting at time t, the 270 probability that it is still digesting at time t + 1 is (1 -α). To this end, we concentrate on a focal nestling in the nest, and calculate its 280 survival probability q. This probability will depend on the parameters n, T, α and the 281 function f. Since all nestlings behave in exactly the same way, it is immediate that the 282 expected value of the focal nestling's food YT accumulated up to time T is m := E(YT) 283 = T/n. Note that for the selfish family (α = 1), YT follows a binomial distribution of 284 order T and parameter 1/n, thus it can be approximated with a normal distribution 285 with expectation m and variance T 2 (1), where  2 (1) =        n n 1 1 1
. We show in 286
Appendix 1 that this result holds more generally: for any 0 < α <1, YT is 287 approximately normally distributed with expectation m and variance T 2 (α), and we 288
give the precise analytic form of the asymptotic variance  2 (α). We can see that for 289 any nestling number n and 0 < α < 1, the inequality
Thus, we can conclude that in the honest family, the variance of the food amount 291 acquired by the focal nestling is always smaller than in the selfish family. 292
293
Let us turn to the survival of the young birds. We have n nestlings, whose 294 accumulated food amounts are YT,1, YT,2,..., YT,n. Denote by Vi the indicator of the 295 event that the i th nestling survives. Then the number of surviving young birds is 296
where q is the survival probability of the, say, focal nestling. If the survival 299 function is f(x), and we use the normal approximation YT ~ N(m, T 2 (α)) for the 300 accumulated food amount of the focal nestling, then 301
where φ(x) denotes the standard normal density. As an illustrating example, let 303
, where Φ(x) denotes the standard normal distribution function. and the f parameter regulates the "steepness" of f around mf. Let U, W be two 306 independent standard normal variables, and X = fU and (iii) the survival rate depends on total density and it is the same for all 319 individuals, independently of their phenotype and age; and finally (iv) the interactions 320 within the kin during reproduction and the density dependent survival process during 321 the survival stage are independent. Following these assumptions our model can be 322 described as a combination of the following two sub-models. 323
324
The first sub-model describes what happens during the reproduction season, 325 when the non-interacting females produce offspring, and the interactions (determining 326 the demographic parameters of the different phenotypes) take place only within the parents and their offspring. Here, the main point is that the phenotype-dependent 329 demographic parameters determine the next age-classified state vector of the 330 phenotype, so the stage of each phenotype is a demography vector, and each 331 phenotype can be described by a Leslie matrix. Figure 7 shows an example. In the second sub-model, by a random survival process, the total population 345 size is reduced to a fixed carrying capacity. Here, the main point is that the density-346 dependent survival process during autumn and winter, has a uniform effect on the 347 
We have found that, in the framework kin demographic selection model, the fitness of 358 the phenotype is the phenotypic long-term growth rate. This is the dominant positive 359 eigenvalue of the Leslie matrix, which is a solution of the following characteristic 360 polynomial: 361 strictly increases in 2  and 3  thus  also increases. 367 368 Now we will apply the above kin demographic selection model. The 369 phenotype of an individual determines two behaviours in our model: its behaviour 370 during the juvenile stage, and the behaviour during the adult stage. There are two 371 potential trade-offs in the phenotypic Leslie matrix. 372
The first trade-off takes place in the parent-offspring interactions: parents have 373 limited resources, they have to feed themselves and their offspring from a fix quantity 374 of food. Accordingly, the parent's phenotype determines both the survival rate and the 375 fecundity parameter of the phenotypic Leslie matrix. The second one is in between the 376 offspring: an honest nestling is begging food only when it is hungry, a selfish nestling 377 is always begging food, thus the latter strategy decreases the survival rate of its sibs. 378 Therefore, the phenotype of juveniles effects the fecundity parameters of the 379 phenotypic Leslie matrix (see Section 3 and 4). We investigate two distinct 380 phenotypes: honest and selfish. Since we consider an asexual population therefore 381 either all juveniles are honest or all are selfish in any given nest. The reasons for this 382 are the following: First, when a mutant appears, a mixed family is formed (there are 383 both honest and selfish juveniles), but independently of mutant's success in a mixed 384 family, in the next generation all offspring of the mutant has the same mutant strategy 385 in an asexual population. Secondly, concerning the long-term growth rate of 386 phenotypes, the initial success of a single mutant is not so important. 387
388
To extend our investigation we introduced age-structure in populations. For 389 sake of simplicity, we assume that neither the fecundity nor the survival do not 390 depend on the age of the parent. Let us consider a 3 year-long life span described by 391 the Leslie-matrix (L) with fecundities    i , and survival rates    i . (For sake of 392 simplicity we assume same fecundities and same survival rates for the two age-In the first scenario we assume that a fixed amount T of food is distributed 395 between nestlings, and M is such that the survival probability of the parent is 396 0.95
 
. We assume that the fecundities are
is the 397 survival probability of the focal nestling (see previous section). The growth of 398 population can be characterized by the leading eigenvalue  of matrix L. According to 399 Remark 1, this growth rate is a strictly increasing function of ) (  . 400
In the second scenario let us assume that the total food M is fixed, and the 401 mother distributes only the 1 0   s fraction of it between nestlings (the total food 402 distributed between nestlings is T=sM) and eats the remaining amount of 403
. Let us assume that the survival probability function of a mother as a 404 function of  has the following form: Contrary to these scenarios the source of randomness during parent-offspring 420 interactions comes from the fact that the parent is not fully informed from the actual 421 stage (either hungry or digesting) of its offspring in our case. Our result is different in 422 another crucial way: the honest signal decreases the variance of fitness, and increases 423 the mean of fitness, at a time. This is different from the traditional definition: "Bet-424
hedging is defined as a strategy that reduces the temporal variance in fitness at the If 0 < α < 1, then we model the feeding process with a Markov chain Xt, t = 1, 2, 512 ..., T, where Xt denotes the state of the process just after the parent has given away the 513 t th unit of food (i.e., the state of the process at time t). We will have a total of d = 3n -514 2 different states, each state will be a pair (i, k), where i denotes the state of the focal 515 nestling: it can be any of the three possibilities H (hungry), D (digesting previously 516 received food) or R (it just received food). The second coordinate k records the 517 number of digesting nestlings (either digesting food received earlier, or food received 518 at this moment) among the remaining n -1 ones. There are n -1 states (H, k), k = 1, 519 ..., n -1, also n -1 states (D, k), k = 1, ..., n -1, and n states (R, k), k = 0, 1, ..., n -1. 520
We denote the state space by S. From the previous description of the process, it is 521 immediate to write down the transition matrix P of the Markov chain Xt. 
and all other elements are zero. The (R, k) th row of the transition matrix for k < n -1 530 is: 531
and all other elements are zero. The (R, k) th row of the transition matrix for k = n -1 535 is of the same form, except that 536 , ) , where the additional terms cover the cases when none of the nestlings are hungry. . It is a standard result that the central limit theorem holds 548 for YT. To formulate the precise statement, let П be the d d  matrix whose (u, v) th 549 entry is πv, and Пdg the d d  diagonal matrix whose (u, u) th entry is πu, and all other 550 entries are 0. The 
